Potential Source Apportionment and Meteorological Conditions Involved in Airborne ¹³¹I Detections in January/February 2017 in Europe

authored by

Olivier Masson, Georg Steinhauser, H. Wershofen, Jerzy W. Mietelski, Helmut W. Fischer, L. Pourcelot, O. Saunier, J. Bieringer, T. Steinkopff, M. Hýža, B. Møller, T. W. Bowyer, E. Dalaka, A. Dalheimer, A. De Vismes-Ott, Konstantinos Eleftheriadis, M. Forte, C. Gasco Leonarte, K. Gorzkiewicz, Z. Homoki, K. Isajenko, T. Karhunen, C. Katzlberger, R. Kierepko, J. Kövendiné Kónyi, H. Malá, J. Nikolic, P. P. Povinec, M. Rajacic, W. Ringer, P. Rulík, R. Rusconi, G. Sáfrány, I. Sykora, D. Todorović, J. Tschiersch, Kurt Ungar, B. Zorko

Abstract

Traces of particulate radioactive iodine (¹³¹I) were detected in the European atmosphere in January/February 2017. Concentrations of this nuclear fission product were very low, ranging 0.1 to 10 μBq m^-3 except at one location in western Russia where they reached up to several mBq m^-3. Detections have been reported continuously over an 8-week period by about 30 monitoring stations. We examine possible emission source apportionments and rank them considering their expected contribution in terms of orders of magnitude from typical routine releases: radiopharmaceutical production units > sewage sludge incinerators > nuclear power plants > spontaneous fission of uranium in soil. Inverse modeling simulations indicate that the widespread detections of ¹³¹I resulted from the combination of multiple source releases. Among them, those from radiopharmaceutical production units remain the most likely. One of them is located in Western Russia and its estimated source term complies with authorized limits. Other existing sources related to ¹³¹I use (medical purposes or sewage sludge incineration) can explain detections on a rather local scale. As an enhancing factor, the prevailing wintertime meteorological situations marked by strong temperature inversions led to poor dispersion conditions that resulted in higher concentrations exceeding usual detection limits in use within the informal Ring of Five (Ro5) monitoring network.

Organisation(s)

Centre for Radiation Protection and Radioecology

External Organisation(s)

IRSN Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire
National Metrology Institute of Germany (PTB)
Instytut Chemii Bioorganicznej Polskiej Akademii Nauk
University of Bremen
Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS)
Deutscher Wetterdienst (DWD)
National Radiation Protection Institute (NRPI)
Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (DSA)
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
National Centre of Scientific Research DEMOKRITOS (NCSR Demokritos)
Agenzia Regionale per la Protezione dell'Ambiente della Lombardia (ARPA Lombardia)
Centre for Energy, Environmental and Technological Research (CIEMAT)
Agricultural Biotechnology Center Godollo
Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK)
Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety (AGES)
University of Belgrade
Comenius University
Helmholtz Zentrum München - German Research Center for Environmental Health
Health Canada
Jožef Stefan Institute (JSI)

Type

Article

Journal

Environmental Science and Technology

Volume

52

Pages

8488-8500

No. of pages

13

ISSN

0013-936X

Publication date

07.08.2018

Publication status

Published

Peer reviewed

Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Chemistry(all), Environmental Chemistry

Electronic version(s)

https://push-zb.helmholtz-muenchen.de/deliver.php?id=22532 (Access: Open)
https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.8b01810 (Access: Closed)