Potential Source Apportionment and Meteorological Conditions Involved in Airborne ¹³¹I Detections in January/February 2017 in Europe

verfasst von

Olivier Masson, Georg Steinhauser, H. Wershofen, Jerzy W. Mietelski, Helmut W. Fischer, L. Pourcelot, O. Saunier, J. Bieringer, T. Steinkopff, M. Hýža, B. Møller, T. W. Bowyer, E. Dalaka, A. Dalheimer, A. De Vismes-Ott, Konstantinos Eleftheriadis, M. Forte, C. Gasco Leonarte, K. Gorzkiewicz, Z. Homoki, K. Isajenko, T. Karhunen, C. Katzlberger, R. Kierepko, J. Kövendiné Kónyi, H. Malá, J. Nikolic, P. P. Povinec, M. Rajacic, W. Ringer, P. Rulík, R. Rusconi, G. Sáfrány, I. Sykora, D. Todorović, J. Tschiersch, Kurt Ungar, B. Zorko

Abstract

Traces of particulate radioactive iodine (¹³¹I) were detected in the European atmosphere in January/February 2017. Concentrations of this nuclear fission product were very low, ranging 0.1 to 10 μBq m^-3 except at one location in western Russia where they reached up to several mBq m^-3. Detections have been reported continuously over an 8-week period by about 30 monitoring stations. We examine possible emission source apportionments and rank them considering their expected contribution in terms of orders of magnitude from typical routine releases: radiopharmaceutical production units > sewage sludge incinerators > nuclear power plants > spontaneous fission of uranium in soil. Inverse modeling simulations indicate that the widespread detections of ¹³¹I resulted from the combination of multiple source releases. Among them, those from radiopharmaceutical production units remain the most likely. One of them is located in Western Russia and its estimated source term complies with authorized limits. Other existing sources related to ¹³¹I use (medical purposes or sewage sludge incineration) can explain detections on a rather local scale. As an enhancing factor, the prevailing wintertime meteorological situations marked by strong temperature inversions led to poor dispersion conditions that resulted in higher concentrations exceeding usual detection limits in use within the informal Ring of Five (Ro5) monitoring network.

Organisationseinheit(en)

Institut für Radioökologie und Strahlenschutz

Externe Organisation(en)

IRSN Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire
Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB)
Instytut Chemii Bioorganicznej Polskiej Akademii Nauk
Universität Bremen
Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz (BfS)
Deutscher Wetterdienst (DWD)
National Radiation Protection Institute (NRPI)
Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (DSA)
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
National Centre of Scientific Research DEMOKRITOS (NCSR Demokritos)
Agenzia Regionale per la Protezione dell'Ambiente della Lombardia (ARPA Lombardia)
Centro de Investigaciones Energéticas, Medioambientales y Tecnológicas (CIEMAT)
Agricultural Biotechnology Center Godollo
Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection (CLOR)
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK)
Agentur für Gesundheit und Ernährungssicherheit GmbH (AGES)
University of Belgrade
Comenius University
Helmholtz Zentrum München - Deutsches Forschungszentrum für Gesundheit und Umwelt
Health Canada
Institut "Jožef Stefan" (IJS)

Typ

Artikel

Journal

Environmental Science and Technology

Band

52

Seiten

8488-8500

Anzahl der Seiten

13

ISSN

0013-936X

Publikationsdatum

07.08.2018

Publikationsstatus

Veröffentlicht

Peer-reviewed

Ja

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

Chemie (insg.), Umweltchemie

Elektronische Version(en)

https://push-zb.helmholtz-muenchen.de/deliver.php?id=22532 (Zugang: Offen)
https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.8b01810 (Zugang: Geschlossen)